The Alleged Distinction between Euthanasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually Incoherent and Impossible to Maintain by Orentlicher, David
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1998
The Alleged Distinction between Euthanasia and
the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment:
Conceptually Incoherent and Impossible to
Maintain
David Orentlicher
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at
the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Orentlicher, David, "The Alleged Distinction between Euthanasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually
Incoherent and Impossible to Maintain" (1998). Scholarly Works. 1166.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/1166
THE ALLEGED DISTINCTION
BETWEEN EUTHANASIA AND THE
WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: CONCEPTUALLY
INCOHERENT AND IMPOSSIBLE
TO MAINTAIN
David Orentlicher*
Richard Epstein, in his book Mortal Peril, supports euthana-
sia and assisted suicide and rejects the distinction between them
and withdrawal of treatment. In this essay, Professor Orentlicher
argues that Epstein is correct in finding no meaningful moral dis-
tinction between euthanasia and treatment withdrawal, examines
the reasons why the distinction has persisted in American jurispru-
dence, and explains why the distinction has eroded.
Epstein also concludes in his book that there is no constitu-
tional right to euthanasia or assisted suicide. Professor Oren-
tlicher's response is that constitutionality is not the appropriate
inquiry; rather, the better question is whether to recognize a right to
assisted suicide once a right to euthanasia in the form of terminal
sedation already exists. He answers this question in the affirmative,
arguing that assisted suicide enhances patient welfare and reduces
risks of abuse in a world with euthanasia.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before reading Mortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health
Care?,' I was not sure what position Richard Epstein would take on
euthanasia (and physician-assisted suicide).' On the one hand, his lib-
ertarian philosophy suggested that he would support the legalization
* Professor of Law and Codirector, Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis. This article was written when the author was the Visiting DeCamp Professor
of Bioethics, Princeton University. A.B. 1977, Brandeis University; M.D. 1981, Harvard Medical
School; J.D. 1986, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for the contributions of Judy Failer.
1. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?
(1997).
2. I mention euthanasia first and assisted suicide second because that is the order in which
Epstein takes up the two practices. See generally id. chs. 13 & 14.
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of euthanasia. On the other hand, his affinity for the common law 3
suggested he might support the common-law tradition of a prohibition
on euthanasia.4
In fact, both strands of Epsteinian thought shape the argument in
this important new book. Invoking principles of individual autonomy,
Epstein first explains why states should permit euthanasia (or assisted
suicide) just as they have permitted the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. His rejection of the distinction between treatment with-
drawal and euthanasia is very much on target. As Epstein observes,
the usual philosophical and practical arguments for the distinction do
not withstand scrutiny-the concerns raised about euthanasia also ap-
ply to withdrawal of treatment.5
But when it comes to the constitutional issue, the common-law
Epstein dominates. Given the risks of abuse, Epstein argues that it
would be wrong, at least at this time, for there to be a constitutional
right to euthanasia or assisted suicide.6 Accordingly, he concludes,
the Supreme Court should not override state bans on euthanasia or
assisted suicide.7
Although there is an apparent inconsistency between Epstein's
support for euthanasia/assisted suicide and his objection to a constitu-
tional right to either, he provides a reasonable basis for the different
outcomes.8 Hence, it is not worth dwelling on this point. Indeed,
there are larger issues on which to focus discussion. First, I will indi-
cate an important way in which Epstein could have pursued the impli-
cations of his moral analysis. Second, I will suggest a more
appropriate way to frame the constitutional question.
The implications of Epstein's moral analysis are pertinent in
terms of his rejection of the distinction between treatment withdrawal
and euthanasia/assisted suicide. Epstein is surely correct that there is
no meaningful moral distinction here. Yet, if there really is no moral
difference at work, we need to explain why many courts, legislatures,
and scholars still invest the distinction with great weight. Accordingly,
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN Vii-Viii (1985) (stating that "[flrom the time I first entered teaching in 1968,
my main interest has been in the common law" and observing that the common-law rules of
property, tort, and contract form "the basis of our legal culture").
4. Cf Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2263 (1997) ("[F]or over 700 years, the
Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide
and assisting suicide.").
5. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 289; see also David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Phy-
sician-Assisted Suicide, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 663 (1996) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Legaliza-
tion]; David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest
Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443 (1997) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Modest Revolution]. In Parts II
and III of this article, I draw on these two earlier articles.
6. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 330-31.
7. See id. at 343. The book came out just before the Supreme Court's assisted suicide
decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), and Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
[Vol. 1998
EUTHANASIA/WITHDRAWAL DISTINCTION
I will explore the reasons why the distinction has played a critical role
in American jurisprudence. I will also argue that we can understand
the current erosion of the distinction (e.g., in Oregon's enactment of a
statute permitting assisted suicide) 9 in terms of the reasons why we
have maintained the distinction for so many years.
On the constitutional issue, I will argue that the question is not
whether to grant a constitutional right to euthanasia or assisted sui-
cide. As a practical matter, a right to euthanasia was effectively
granted when the Supreme Court recognized a right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health.'° Rather, the question is whether to recognize a right to as-
sisted suicide once a right to euthanasia already exists. And, on that
question, I will argue that assisted suicide enhances patient welfare
and reduces risks in a world in which euthanasia is permitted.
II. REJECTING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TREATMENT
WITHDRAWAL AND EUTHANASIA/AsSISTED SUICIDE
Epstein's rejection of the distinction between treatment with-
drawal and euthanasia/assisted suicide follows ineluctably from his
"simple rules for a complex world."1 In Epstein's view, the ideal so-
ciety is one based on individual autonomy, with the state stepping in
only to protect individuals from force and deceit. 2 In an autonomy-
driven world, as long as a patient makes a competent, informed, and
voluntary choice (i.e., a choice that reflects a genuine expression of
autonomy rather than misinformation or coercion), it should be irrele-
vant whether the person chooses to die by withdrawal of treatment,
euthanasia, or assisted suicide.
Although one might challenge Epstein on his choice of founda-
tional principles, his objections to the treatment withdrawal and eu-
thanasia/assisted suicide distinction do not stand or fall on his simple
rules. As we will see, the problems with the distinction exist over a
wide range of moral systems.13 Let us now turn to Epstein's argu-
ments against the distinction.
A. The Act-Omission Distinction
As Epstein observes, courts and scholars who reject euthanasia/
assisted suicide but support treatment withdrawal commonly cite the
9. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (1996).
10. 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
11. Epstein previously developed these rules in greater depth in his book, SIMPLE RULES
FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
12. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 8-13.
13. Epstein's principles are nevertheless important. Deciding that there is no moral dis-
tinction between withdrawal of treatment and euthanasia/assisted suicide leaves the question
whether we should permit or prohibit both practices together. Epstein's principles tell us that
we should permit both treatment withdrawal and euthanasia/assisted suicide.
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act-omission distinction.14 In the view of these commentators, pa-
tients who die by withdrawal of a ventilator or a feeding tube die from
the underlying disease, while patients who die by euthanasia/assisted
suicide die from the actions of their physicians.15
Although it is often useful to distinguish between acts and omis-
sions, Epstein rightly points out that the distinction lacks moral force
in the context of treatment withdrawal, euthanasia, and assisted sui-
cide.16 A person who turns off a ventilator is surely "acting," and the
law will properly call for the prosecution of someone who turns off a
patient's ventilator without authorization.17 Indeed, in assisted sui-
cide, the physician's action makes less of a causal contribution to the
patient's death than it does in either treatment withdrawal or euthana-
sia.18 When a physician writes a prescription for a lethal dose of bar-
biturates, the physician's role in the patient's death is more attenuated
than is that of the physician who turns off a ventilator on a patient
who cannot breathe without assistance. 9
As others have argued, and as Epstein acknowledges, withdraw-
als of treatment kill only when the person has a fatal disease, while
euthanasia/assisted suicide can kill a healthy person.20 However, Ep-
stein notes, this point demonstrates that "dangerous acts" put more
people at risk than "dangerous omissions," not that individual omis-
sions are morally justified. 1 Moreover, even if it did matter whether
the physician's act would kill only the seriously ill, that argument
would not explain the distinction between treatment withdrawal and
14. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 290.
15. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985) ("[D]eclining life-sustaining
medical treatment may not properly be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide. Refusing medi-
cal intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course; if death were eventually to
occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and not the result of a self-
inflicted injury."); NATIONAL CmR. FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECI-
SION MAKING IN LIFE-SusTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 145 (2d ed. 1992) ("There are
significant moral and legal distinctions between letting die (including the use of medications to
relieve suffering during the dying process) and killing (assisted suicide/euthanasia). In letting
die, the cause of death is seen as the underlying disease process or trauma. In assisted suicide/
euthanasia, the cause of death is seen as the inherently lethal action itself.").
16. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 291.
17. See Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992,
at 10, 13; Giles R. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 473, 480 (1995).
18. See Orentlicher, Modest Revolution, supra note 5, at 448.
19. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
20. See, e.g., Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 52, 53 (observing that "the physician's omission can only bring about death
on the condition that the patient's disease will kill him in the absence of treatment").
21. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 292. In theory, because anyone may commit suicide,
suicide puts more people at risk for premature death than does the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. However, as a practical matter, it is not clear where the greater risk lies. With treat-
ment withdrawal, incompetent patients are at risk for premature death because their family
members may underestimate their desire for life-sustaining treatment. With assisted suicide, the
patient has to perform the life-ending act, and that provides an important safeguard against
abuse. See Marcia Angell, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide-The Ultimate
Right, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50, 51 (1997).
[Vol. 1998
EUTHANASIA/WITHDRAWAL DISTINCTION
euthanasia or assisted suicide. The law does not limit withdrawals of
treatment only to cases in which a patient is irreversibly ill. Patients
whose lives could be saved and who could be restored to very good
health with the brief use of a ventilator or the transfusion of blood can
still refuse the treatment.22
B. Autonomy as Limited by Self-Preservation
Epstein addresses a second conceptual attack on euthanasia/as-
sisted suicide when he discusses the argument that a right to auton-
omy does not imply a right to give up autonomy entirely.23 This
argument may derive from theistic concepts of people as the stewards
of a divinely given body and soul, or from the secular belief that end-
ing one's life is autonomy-defeating rather than autonomy-enhancing.
Regardless of its foundation, Epstein correctly observes that this argu-
ment against euthanasia/assisted suicide also applies to the refusal of
life-sustaining treatment, for that decision also utterly precludes fu-
ture expressions of autonomy. 4
C. Euthanasia/Assisted Suicide Violates the Physician's Role
Epstein cites Leon Kass for a third common objection to eutha-
nasia/assisted suicide: Although there might be a role for euthanasia
and suicide, it would violate the professional role of physicians to par-
ticipate in either act.25 According to Kass, physicians are fundamen-
tally preservers of life and therefore must not engage in death-causing
activities.26 Moreover, to do so would undermine patient trust in
physicians.27
Epstein rejects this objection as well, in large part because he be-
lieves that Kass's argument misconceives the nature of the patient-
physician relationship. According to Epstein, the relationship should
be defined by the voluntary agreement of the patient and the physi-
cian.28 Ethical considerations are relevant to the extent that the pa-
tient and physician import them into their relationship. The principle
of autonomy requires only that the patient and physician come to an
agreement that is not poisoned by incompetence, fraud, or undue in-
22. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Ct. App. 1986) (a compe-
tent adult patient "has the right to refuse any medical treatment, even that which may save or
prolong her life"); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (N.J. 1985) (a competent patient's right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment "would not be affected by her medical condition or prognosis");
Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 84 (N.Y. 1990) (recognizing the right of a 36-year-old adult
with serious bleeding during a cesarean section to refuse blood transfusions that could restore
her to good health).
23. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 293-97.
24. See id. at 294.
25. See id. at 306-07.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 307.
28. See id.
No. 3]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
fluence. Otherwise, autonomy does not leave room for externally im-
posed limits on the kinds of agreements that patients and physicians
can reach.29
This response to Kass is controversial, but it is not critical to
countering the argument from the physician's professional role. As
Epstein points out, the logic of Kass also applies to withdrawals of
life-sustaining treatment.3 0 Physicians are free to turn off ventilators
not only when the patient will die without the ventilator, but also
when the patient might still be restored to very good health.3 '
There are other important responses to Kass as well. Physicians
are providers of comfort just as fundamentally as they are preservers
of life. When the life-preserving and comforting roles conflict, it is not
clear why the life-preserving role should take priority. Indeed, if we
view the physician's role as being fundamentally about the relief of
discomfort or disease, with preservation of life being a part of that
role, then the obligation to relieve suffering would take priority over
the obligation to preserve life.32 Under this view, patients' mistrust of
physicians is bred not by the thought that physicians may dispense
lethal agents, but by the thought that they will not do SO. 3 3 Patients
fear that, when they are suffering intolerably, they will be denied the
drugs that are necessary to end their suffering. 4
29. See id. at 307-08. Although Epstein and Kass have different views about the nature of
the patient-physician relationship, that difference does not necessarily lead to different views
about the physician's professional role. From their different theories, Epstein and Kass could
come to exactly the same ethical responsibilities of physicians. For example, under Epstein's
voluntary-agreement view, one could argue that physicians should adopt a code of ethics that
incorporates the constraints to which patients and physicians would normally agree. It does not
make sense for patients and physicians to start from scratch in negotiating the terms of their
relationship. It is more efficient to start from a baseline of commonly accepted terms of the
relationship (e.g., confidentiality and truth telling).
Under Epstein's view, patients and physicians in a particular relationship could decide
whether to deviate from the normally assumed conditions of the patient-physician relationship.
However, Epstein would not give patients and physicians complete freedom to do so. Because
of the risk of fraud or abuse, parties to a contract are limited in their ability to fashion their own
agreement. See id. at 314-15. Thus, in an Epsteinian world, some background terms of the
patient-physician relationship could be relinquished, while other terms would have to remain
part of any individual patient-physician relationship. Similarly, Kass would undoubtedly view
some ethical responsibilities of physicians as waivable by a patient (e.g., confidentiality) and
others as nonwaivable (e.g, the duty not to assist a suicide).
30. See id. at 307.
31. See supra note 22.
32. See Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 5, at 664; Orentlicher, Modest Revolution,
supra note 5, at 452.
33. See MARGARET PABST BATTIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 206 (1995).
34. See Christine K. Cassel & Diane E. Meier, Morals and Moralism in the Debate over
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 750, 751 (1990). In a survey of adult
patients, researchers found that 90.5% of the patients would consider a physician who assisted
suicides to be as trustworthy as other physicians in providing care to critically ill patients. See
generally Mark A. Graber et al., Patients' Views About Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide
and Euthanasia, 11 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 71 (1996) (studying 228 patients at a single univer-
sity-based family practice program).
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Second, even accepting the premise that preserving life is the fun-
damental physician role, permitting euthanasia and assisted suicide
can facilitate that role. As Epstein later notes, although euthanasia
and assisted suicide will shorten some patients' lives, they will prolong
other patients' lives.35 What patients often want from the right to eu-
thanasia/assisted suicide is not so much the ability to die but the
knowledge that they have control over the timing of their death.36
Without such control, patients may choose to die too soon rather than
too late.37 In addition, if euthanasia and assisted suicide are available,
patients may be more willing to undergo aggressive medical treat-
ments that are painful and risky. If the treatments do not succeed but
only worsen the patients' condition, the patients would be assured that
they could end their suffering. Without such assurance, they might
well forgo the treatments entirely.38
D. Abuse and Overreaching
Epstein reserves a separate chapter for a fourth important objec-
tion to euthanasia/assisted suicide: Although it may be possible to im-
agine appropriate cases for patients to take their lives by euthanasia
or suicide, serious problems of abuse will follow the legalization of the
practices as weak and vulnerable patients are pressured to end their
lives by emotionally and/or financially burdened families and physi-
cians.39 As Epstein points out, the law has long worried about abuse
or overreaching in the context of other seemingly voluntary transac-
tions (e.g., ordinary consumer sales).40 The more likely it is that abuse
will occur, the greater the justification for regulation or even prohibi-
tion, because it is not always possible to expose cases of incompe-
tence, fraud, or undue influence.
Conceptual arguments about the risk of abuse deserve considera-
tion, Epstein notes, but they do not tell us how to balance the harms
from underregulation (killing people who want to live) with the harms
from overregulation (keeping people alive who want to die).41 For
help on this question, Epstein turns to the Dutch experience, because
the Netherlands is the one country with substantial and documented
experience with institutionalized physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia.42
Epstein finds that the Dutch experience does not demonstrate se-
rious problems of abuse. In the Netherlands, euthanasia and assisted
35. See EpsTEIN, supra note 1, at 308-11.
36. See Brock, supra note 17, at 11.
37. See EpsTEIN, supra note 1, at 309-10.
38. See Orentlicher, Modest Revolution, supra note 5, at 452-53.
39. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 313.
40. See id. at 314-15.
41. See id. at 315-16.
42. See id. at 317.
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suicide are technically illegal, but physicians can avoid prosecution by
adhering to strict guidelines.43 As Epstein recognizes, leading studies
have found that, in about twenty-five percent of cases involving eutha-
nasia or physician-assisted suicide, the strict procedural safeguards are
not satisfied." However, Epstein points out, the rule violations do
not generally reflect the administration of euthanasia or assisted sui-
cide against the patient's wishes or in response to coercion by family
members or physicians. Rather, the violations tend to reflect failures
to adhere to reporting requirements or to obtain outside review.45 In
other words, the abuses in the Netherlands do not seem to involve the
kinds of problems that the rules are designed to avoid. Epstein also
points to private safeguards that have developed in the Netherlands to
reinforce the legal safeguards. For example, if patients fear that their
lives will be ended against their wishes when they are unable to object
because of mental incompetence, they can choose hospitals and nurs-
ing homes that, as a matter of institutional policy, have rejected as-
sisted suicide and euthanasia.46
Moreover, as Epstein notes, the Netherlands experience may
show that legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide leads to abuse, but
the same concerns of abuse arise with the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment.47 Indeed, studies have consistently shown that physicians
do not follow ethical and legal guidelines when implementing with-
drawals of life-sustaining treatment. 48 In a study of living wills, physi-
cians overrode a patient's treatment preference twenty-five percent of
the time, and, in three-quarters of those overrides, the physician with-
43. See id. at 317-20. For example, the patient must be competent, and the wish to die must
be voluntary, persistent, and thoughtfully reached. The patient must also be experiencing un-
bearable suffering that cannot be relieved by other means, and the physician must consult with
an experienced colleague for confirmation that the guidelines have been satisfied. See Maurice
A.M. de Wachter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 23, 23;
Barney Sneiderman, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for Canada?, 8 HUMANE MED.
104, 105-06 (1992).
44. See Paul J. Van der Maas et al., Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Med-
ical Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1699, 1701 (1996).
45. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 321-22. The Dutch studies also indicate that cases in
violation of the safeguards often involve a patient who "had in a previous phase of his or her
illness expressed a wish for euthanasia should suffering become unbearable," who was "near to
death and clearly suffering grievously, yet verbal contact had become impossible," or cases in
which the decision had been discussed with the patient but the patient's wishes had not been
expressed explicitly and persistently. Id.; see also Paul J. Van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and
Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANCET 669, 672 (1991); Van der Maas
et al., supra note 44, at 1701-02.
46. See EPsnIN, supra note 1, at 324-25.
47. See id. at 328.
48. See David Orentlicher, The Limits of Legislation, 53 Mo. L. REV. 1255, 1280-1301
(1994). See generally The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care
for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for
Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
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held treatment desired by the patient.49 Similarly, another study has
shown that physicians often write do-not-resuscitate orders without
discussing the matter with patients who still possess decision-making
capacity.50 Abuses of policy are a serious concern, but they do not
explain why the United States has distinguished between treatment
withdrawal and euthanasia/assisted suicide. If the risks of such abuse
are reason enough to condemn decisions to shorten a patient's life,
they should lead a person to oppose treatment withdrawal as well as
euthanasia and assisted suicide."1
There are two other important arguments for the distinction be-
tween treatment withdrawal and euthanasia/assisted suicide that Ep-
stein does not discuss but that are also refutable. First, there are
considerations of intent; second there are considerations of negative
rights and bodily integrity.
E. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Involve an Intent to Kill"2
Treatment withdrawal differs from euthanasia/assisted suicide, it
is argued, because the intent is to discontinue an unwanted treatment,
not to kill the patient. In contrast, with euthanasia or assisted suicide,
the physician must necessarily intend death because the physician re-
lieves the patient's suffering precisely by bringing about the patient's
death. In other words, with treatment withdrawal, the patient's death
is an unfortunate consequence of the effort to relieve the patient's
suffering, while with euthanasia/assisted suicide, the patient's death is
the means to the end of relieving the patient's suffering.
This argument depends on an unduly narrow view of euthanasia/
assisted suicide, one in which the focus is on the implementation of
euthanasia/assisted suicide rather than on the agreement to perform
the act. To see how this is so, consider scenarios in which dying pa-
tients express concern about their suffering and ask their physicians
about the possibility of euthanasia/assisted suicide at some point in
the future. If the physicians indicate that euthanasia/assisted suicide
will be available in the event that the suffering becomes unbearable
and unrelievable, patients will receive a critical reassurance that can
alleviate their anxiety about what lies ahead. The patients may never
exercise their right to euthanasia/assisted suicide, 3 but it is important
49. See Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-sustaining
Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 884-85 (1991).
50. See Andrew L. Evans & Baruch A. Brody, The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order in Teaching
Hospitals, 253 JAMA 2236, 2236 (1985). A do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order means that no ef-
forts will be made to revive a patient who suffers a cardiac arrest (i.e., the heart stops beating).
51. See Orentlicher, Modest Revolution, supra note 5, at 461.
52. The argument in this section was previously made in id. at 455-57.
53. Indeed, many patients who receive a lethal supply of a drug in contemplation of as-
sisted suicide never use it. See Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthana-
sia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919, 922 (1996)
(finding that 39% of 38 patients who received a prescription from their physician for assisted
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to their current well-being that they know they can.54 The patient's
death, then, is not simply a means to relieving the patient's suffering.
Rather, it is an unfortunate consequence of the effort to reassure the
patient about the future.
The intent argument also fails to distinguish between treatment
withdrawal and euthanasia/assisted suicide because many treatment
withdrawals reflect an intent to die. Patients often refuse life-sus-
taining treatment because they perceive their life as burdensome and
therefore want to die." When physicians discontinue the life-sus-
taining treatment for these patients, they are doing so to facilitate an
intent to die.56 It is true that the patients would want to live if they
were not suffering from their illness or injury, but the same can be said
for ill or injured patients who request euthanasia or assistance with
suicide.
In any event, arguments about the physician's subjective intent
are not sufficient. The law typically holds people responsible for the
foreseeable consequences of their acts, even if they had no intent to
cause those consequences.5 If lack of intent is to excuse physicians
from causing their patients' deaths, we need an additional argument as
to why lack of intent ought to matter. If the argument for treatment
withdrawal is that patients cannot be required to stay alive if they are
experiencing unacceptable suffering or if they have made a considered
and competent decision to end their life, we are left with an argument
that does not distinguish between treatment withdrawal and euthana-
sia/assisted suicide.
suicide did not use the prescription); Diane E. Meier et al., A National Survey of Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States, 338 NEW ENO. J. MED. 1193, 1195 (1998)
(finding that 41% of patients who received a prescription from their physician for assisted sui-
cide did not use the prescription).
54. Moreover, because the reassurance depends on the promise that euthanasia/assisted
suicide will be available in the future, physicians must deliver on their promise for the patients
who request its fulfillment if the promise is to be effective for patients who will never ask for
euthanasia/assisted suicide.
55. An example is provided by McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990), discussed by
Epstein, in which a 31-year-old man who was quadriplegic and ventilator-dependent received
judicial permission to disconnect his ventilator because he felt that life would be intolerable after
the death of his terminally ill father. Bergstedt was concerned that others would not give him
the same quality of care as his father had given him. See EPsTEIN, supra note 1, at 286.
56. Moreover, in many cases of treatment withdrawal, the physician may be harboring an
independent wish to see the patient die. Nevertheless, we do not limit withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment because of that possibility. See John Arras, News from the Circuit Courts:
How Not to Think About Physician-Assisted Suicide, BIOLAw SPECIAL SECTION, July-Aug. 1996,
at S171, S181.
57. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at
280-300 (5th ed. 1984).
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F. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Imply a Positive Right58
Some commentators distinguish the withdrawal of treatment
from euthanasia/assisted suicide on the ground that a right to refuse
treatment is a negative right to be left alone while a right to euthana-
sia or assisted suicide would be a positive right to command aid. This
argument mischaracterizes the nature of a right to euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide. Such a right would not mean that patients could re-
quire physicians to assist suicides or perform euthanasia.59 Rather,
the right would prevent the state from interfering when a patient and
physician voluntarily agree on a course of euthanasia/assisted suicide.
Physicians would participate in euthanasia/assisted suicide only if they
were willing to do so, just as physicians perform abortions only if they
are willing to do so. A right to euthanasia or assisted suicide, too, is a
negative right to be left alone.
Still, some argue, the distinction between treatment withdrawal
and euthanasia/assisted suicide reflects the law's traditional protection
against unwanted physical touchings.6 ° Imposition of unwanted medi-
cal treatment is a battery and therefore unlawful. Denying someone
the right to euthanasia/assisted suicide does not result in a battery and
therefore does not implicate the individual's right to bodily integrity.
There are a few problems with this battery argument. First, we
can characterize the right to euthanasia or assisted suicide as a right to
preserve bodily integrity. Terminal illness typically ravages a person's
body, and a dying person's choice of euthanasia/assisted suicide may
reflect a desire to avoid further bodily deterioration.61 Second, it is
not clear that we want to rest individual autonomy on considerations
of bodily integrity. If preserving bodily integrity were the critical is-
sue, we would end up with the perverse result that an individual would
have a stronger interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment without
government interference than in obtaining life-sustaining treatment
without government interference.6" Similarly, a law prohibiting repro-
duction would be less violative of individual rights than a law prohibit-
ing abortion. However, we should be just as troubled by a law
denying procreation as a law denying abortion.
58. The argument in this section was previously made in Orentlicher, Modest Revolution,
supra note 5, at 457-58.
59. Epstein makes this point in another context. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 306.
60. See Scofield, supra note 17, at 478-79.
61. It may be argued that the bodily invasion by disease is different from the bodily inva-
sion by medical treatment because the invasion is "natural" in the former case. Yet, the disease
may have resulted from "unnatural" causes like cigarette smoking or environmental pollution.
Moreover, the right to abortion is a right based on considerations of bodily integrity in the face
of a "natural" invasion.
62. If we defend the right to obtain life-sustaining treatment without government interfer-
ence by pointing to other individual interests, then we have conceded that avoiding unwanted
invasions of bodily integrity is not the critical issue in determining individual liberties. (The right
to obtain treatment without government interference is different from a right to receive neces-
sary medical treatment.)
No. 3]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Even if we agree that there is something to the fact that the right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment is a right to be free from battery, it
does not help us understand the distinction between treatment with-
drawal and euthanasia/assisted suicide. Society recognizes a right to
be free of unwanted touchings to ensure that individuals have control
over their bodies and are able to exercise self-determination.63 Yet, a
right to euthanasia/assisted suicide would also ensure that individuals
have control over their bodies and are able to exercise self-determina-
tion.64 We still need to explain why considerations of personal auton-
omy are more important with respect to treatment withdrawal than
euthanasia/assisted suicide.
III. EXPLAINING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TREATMENT
WITHDRAWAL AND EUTHANASIA/ASsISTED SUICIDE
As Epstein observes, none of the usual conceptual or practical
arguments really justify the distinction between withdrawal of treat-
ment and euthanasia/assisted suicide. Still, that distinction has existed
for many years, and it needs to be explained. Epstein hints at an ex-
planation that I have developed elsewhere and that fits well within his
autonomy-based view of how the law should be structured.
I have argued that the withdrawal-euthanasia/assisted suicide dis-
tinction reflects an effort to sort morally justified patient deaths from
morally unjustified patient deaths-that the key issue is not whether a
person dies by treatment withdrawal, assisted suicide, or euthanasia,
but whether the person is morally justified in choosing death over con-
tinued life.65 Because there are serious problems with efforts to sort
morally justified deaths from morally unjustified ones on a case-by-
case basis, the law has relied on the bright-line distinction between
treatment withdrawal and euthanasia/assisted suicide, with treatment
withdrawals serving as a reasonable "proxy" for morally justified
deaths and euthanasia/assisted suicides serving as a reasonable
"proxy" for morally unjustified deaths. That is, we permit people to
die by withdrawal of treatment because we believe that, in the vast
majority of cases, deaths by withdrawal of treatment are morally justi-
fied. On the other hand, we do not permit people to die by euthanasia
or assisted suicide because we believe that such deaths frequently
would not be morally justified. Indeed, suicides are commonly com-
mitted by relatively young persons who could have enjoyed life for
63. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo,
J.) (holding that surgery without consent is unlawful because "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body").
64. See Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 2021, 2026-28 (1992).
65. See Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 5, at 664-65; Orentlicher, Modest Revolution,
supra note 5, at 462-67.
[Vol. 1998
EUTHANASIA/WITHDRAWAL DISTINCTION
several more decades if they had undergone appropriate psychological
counseling or other treatment for their despondency.66
This kind of bright-line approach is used often in ethics and law.
For example, when we condition voting rights on reaching the age of
eighteen, we do so because we think that is a reasonable way to
achieve the goal of limiting voting rights to people who have sufficient
maturity and judgment to cast a ballot. Most people age eighteen and
over have the maturity and judgment to vote; most people under age
eighteen lack that maturity and judgment. Clearly, some people will
have achieved the requisite maturity and judgment before age eight-
een, while other persons achieve it at a later age. Nevertheless, we
employ age eighteen for all persons, and we do so because it would be
highly problematic for the government to make case-by-case judg-
ments about a person's qualifications for voting.67
My argument raises two important questions. First, what do I
mean by "morally justified" and "morally unjustified" patient deaths?
Second, why is it necessary to have a bright-line approach rather than
a case-by-case approach for sorting the morally justified from the
morally unjustified? The answer to the second question depends on
the answer to the first question.
If one believes that a patient death is morally justified when it
reflects a genuine expression of the patient's autonomy, as Epstein
68does, we can turn to Epstein for an explanation of the need for a
bright-line approach to identify morally justified and morally unjusti-
fied deaths. If one believes that a patient death is morally justified
when the patient is irreversibly ill and suffering greatly, as I think
most people actually do believe, we can turn to the argument that I
have developed previously.
A. Genuine Expressions of Autonomy as the Moral Justification for
a Patient's Death
We can derive an explanation for the law's bright-line approach
by considering Epstein's response to an important argument against
euthanasia/assisted suicide. As Daniel Callahan has observed, ordina-
rily the law does not allow a person's consent to authorize the killing
of that person by another individual.69 In his response to Callahan,
Epstein discusses why consent is rejected as a defense to homicide in a
66. Fifty-seven percent of all suicides in the United States in 1995 occurred among persons
younger than 45 years of age. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1998, at 965
(Robert Famighetti et al. eds., 1997).
67. We might suspect, for example, that certifications of maturity to vote would look very
different when Democrats controlled the approval process than when Republicans did so.
68. This argument was also made in an amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court's assisted
suicide cases by six distinguished philosophers. See Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The
Philosophers' Brief, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41.
69. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 299-300.
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society in which the law normally gives great weight to a person's con-
sent. 70 He points out that, when the law decides whether there is con-
sent to a particular agreement, it can rely on "observation in the
individual case" or "inference from background knowledge about
general patterns and motivations of human behavior., 71  For some
transactions, we assume that people act in their self-interest and that,
if they agreed to a deal, they must have done so because it made them
better off. In such cases, the only issue for the state is to ensure that
the person did not act out of incompetence, fraud, or duress.72 For
other transactions, however, it is highly unlikely that a competent per-
son would make the alleged deal in the absence of fraud and duress.
If such transactions occur, it is much more likely that they reflect un-
detected incompetence, fraud, or duress than that they reflect a genu-
ine expression of autonomy by the person who appears to be
disadvantaged by the agreement.73 Thus, for example, when a person
is killed, and the killer claims consent on behalf of the victim, we be-
lieve it is highly unlikely that the victim actually consented. More-
over, Bayesian analysis tells us that efforts to ascertain whether
genuine consent was given are going to be unhelpful.74 Because our
methods of ascertainment are necessarily imperfect, and the likeli-
hood of genuine consent is very low, most cases in which we think
there was genuine consent will in fact be cases in which we falsely
conclude that there was genuine consent.75 In a case of a killing, we
might be fooled by the killer into believing that consent was given,76
and we cannot turn to the victim for the other side of the story. Ac-
cordingly, we reject consent as a defense to a killing.77 We assume
that all killings are involuntary and therefore unlawful.
How does this point help us with the distinction between treat-
ment withdrawal and euthanasia/assisted suicide? When a patient re-
fuses life-sustaining treatment, we recognize that there are good
70. See id. at 300-05.
71. Id. at 300-01.
72. See id. at 301.
73. See id. at 301-02.
74. See id. at 302.
75. As indicated, this conclusion follows from the assumption that we believe it highly un-
likely that the expression of autonomy is genuine in the particular circumstances and from the
fact that we have imperfect tests for judging the authenticity of expressions of autonomy. With
imperfect tests and an unlikely event, most times when the test is positive, it is falsely positive. If
you are not familiar with Bayesian analysis, it works as follows: Suppose there is a test that is
used to screen for a particular genetic variant. If the variant is present in 1 in 1000 people (i.e.,
an unlikely event), and the test is administered on people randomly, then 999 of every 1000
people tested will not have the variant. If the test is wrong 10% of the time when a person
without the variant is tested, it will wrongly come up positive for 99 of the 999 people without
the variant. Even if it correctly identifies the 1 in 1000 people with the variant, the test will be
falsely positive 99% of the time that it comes up positive (99/(99 + 1)).
76. Some people are very persuasive liars.
77. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 304. This argument by Epstein is a very important one
that is frequently overlooked by commentators on assisted suicide.
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reasons for a patient to do so. The patient may find the side effects of
the treatment intolerable, may feel that the benefits of continued life
are outweighed by its burdens, or may have religious objections to the
treatment. Given these reasons why patients may refuse treatment,
we allow a right to refuse treatment as long as we are comfortable that
the withdrawal is consistent with the patient's wishes or best interests.
In other words, we can rely on "observation in the individual case."
With euthanasia or assisted suicide, on the other hand, we have
good reason to suspect that the person's choice is not a genuine ex-
pression of autonomy. Treatable depression is a common reason for
patients to attempt, or seek help with, suicide. We worry that the
same would be true for euthanasia. Because we will make mistakes in
deciding whether a person is choosing euthanasia/assisted suicide gen-
uinely or not, we choose to prohibit the practices entirely. In other
words, we rely on "inference from background knowledge about gen-
eral patterns and motivations of human behavior.""8
B. Irreversible Illness and Great Suffering as the Moral
Justifications for a Patient's Death
There is a second important argument for categorical rules rather
than case-by-case analysis when the issue is whether a patient may
choose to die by treatment withdrawal, assisted suicide, or euthanasia.
This argument depends on a different theory of morally justified and
morally unjustified deaths than that proffered by Epstein. Although
autonomy might be the appropriate principle for establishing the mo-
rality of a patient's desire to die, I believe our society actually oper-
ates on the basis of a different principle. We in fact respect decisions
to refuse life-sustaining treatment out of the moral sense that people
should be able to choose death when they are irreversibly ill and suf-
fering intolerably. Choosing death is generally a moral wrong even
when the choice is made autonomously,79 but, when life becomes suf-
ficiently miserable, a person can reasonably believe that continued life
78. Id. at 300-01.
79. There are several reasons why one might believe that choosing death is morally wrong
and therefore that the state should intervene to prevent a patient from choosing death. For
example, there are important concerns about preserving the moral worth of society. If patients
are allowed to die when they consent, people may have less respect for life and be less troubled
when death comes about involuntarily. There are also concerns about avoiding the domination
of one group in society by other groups (here, preventing the victimization of severely disabled
persons). See David Orentlicher, Physician-Assisted Dying: The Conflict with Fundamental
Principles of American Law, in MEDICINE UNBOUND: THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LIMITS OF
MEDICAL INTERVENTION 256 (Robert H. Blank & Andrea L. Bonnicksen eds., 1994).
Even if one believes in individual autonomy as the prevailing ethic, one still might conclude
that the state should intervene to prevent a patient from choosing death. We do not permit
people to take action that defeats autonomy because we believe that it is important to preserve
freedom of choice in areas of profound consequence to happiness. Thus, for example, we do not
permit people to become a slave or renounce their right to a divorce. See id. at 260.
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is worse than death."0 As the Massachusetts Supreme Court has
written:
There is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that
human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to
the State interest where, as here, the issue is not whether but
when, for how long, and at what cost to the individual that life
may be briefly extended. Even if we assume that the State has an
additional interest in seeing to it that individual decisions on the
prolongation of life do not in any way tend to "cheapen" the
value which is placed in the concept of living,... we believe it is
not inconsistent to recognize a right to decline medical treatment
in a situation of incurable illness.81
Under a regime of case-by-case judgments, some representative
of the state would have to possess authority for deciding whether the
treatment withdrawal or the euthanasia/assisted suicide should be per-
mitted. Someone would have to decide whether the person's suffering
is severe enough such that society should allow the person to die. It is
not likely an authority that physicians would welcome, nor is it an
authority that we would likely trust to physicians or other representa-
tives of the state.82 The judgment that a person would be better off
dead is a judgment that can be made only by individuals for them-
selves.8 3 Accordingly, although the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment once was viewed as existing only when a patient's prognosis
was deemed by society as suitably dim and when the patient was re-
fusing care that was deemed by society as particularly burdensome,84
it has become a right of virtually any patient to refuse virtually any
treatment.85 We can permit all patients to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment because the typical withdrawal case in fact involves a patient
80. I base my view on the arguments that have been made by courts, scholars, and religious
authorities to justify a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. I have explained my view in
greater detail in Orentlicher, Modest Revolution, supra note 5, at 450-51.
81. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (Mass.
1977) (involving the right of a profoundly mentally retarded 67-year-old man to have chemother-
apy withheld for leukemia that would respond poorly to treatment).
82. See Callahan, supra note 20, at 55.
83. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1367-68 (2d ed. 1988) (ob-
serving that "having the state regularly make judgments about the value of life" is "the worst
kind of state paternalism"). To be sure, decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment are made
for incompetent persons. There, however, it is generally a family member, friend, or guardian
who decides on the person's behalf, not someone representing the state's interests.
It is true that the government has to establish the bright-line distinction between withdrawal
of treatment and assisted suicide, but that is done in an open process with full public awareness
and participation. Moreover, because all persons are permitted to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment, there is no suggestion that some lives have greater value than others.
84. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) ("[T]he State's interest contra
weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and the prognosis dims.").
85. See supra note 22.
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who is irreversibly ill and suffering. 86 However, we cannot permit as-
sisted suicide or euthanasia as a general right because many people
who are not irreversibly ill would choose to die by suicide or
euthanasia.
C. Changes in the Law
Given the important reasons for choosing bright-line rules and
categorical judgments over case-by-case analysis, it is not surprising
that changes in the law permitting assisted suicide do so by adopting a
new bright-line, categorical approach to distinguishing between per-
missible and impermissible patient deaths. When Oregon and the
U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second and Ninth Circuits recognized a
right to assisted suicide,87 they did so only for terminally ill persons.
Under the approaches of Oregon and the two circuit courts, all termi-
nally ill patients may choose a lethal dose of medication whether or
not they are suffering greatly; neither the statute nor the two decisions
qualify their grant of a right to assisted suicide in terms of the patient's
degree of suffering.88 Conversely, no nonterminally ill patients may
choose to end their lives with a lethal dose of medication even if they
are suffering greatly.89 In addition, as before, all patients who desire
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment may choose that course
whether or not they are suffering greatly. With the infeasibility of
case-by-case determinations, the Second and Ninth Circuits and Ore-
gon chose a new rule to distinguish between permissible and imper-
missible patient deaths, and the new rule essentially reflects the view
that the typical case in which a terminally ill patient desires suicide is a
case in which the patient's death is morally justifiable.9 °
86. If a patient refuses life-sustaining treatment but is not irreversibly ill, treatment will
often be imposed in violation of the person's legal rights. See, e.g., Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674
A.2d 821, 825-26, 832 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff's "common law right of bodily self-
determination was entitled to respect" and that it was error for the trial court to allow the hospi-
tal to administer blood transfusions against the patient's wishes); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819,
821, 828 (Fla. 1993) (same); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 79, 84 (N.Y. 1990). Dubreuil is
particularly striking because the Florida Supreme Court had previously held that a young wo-
man could refuse blood transfusions. See Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97-98 (Fla.
1989).
87. The two circuit courts were later reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), and Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
88. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1996); Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Compassion in Dying v. Washing-
ton, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
89. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805; Quill, 80 F.3d at 731;
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793-94.
90. The point about bright-line, categorical approaches also explains the emphasis in the
law on physical, rather than psychological, pain as a justification for patients ending their lives.
See, e.g., Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that the core of a
right to die with dignity would involve "personal control over the manner of death, professional
medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffering-combined")
(emphasis added). When people claim physical pain from physical illness, we can be more confi-
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Epstein makes a similar point. In his discussion of why it makes
sense to have a categorical prohibition against killing, which is out-
lined above, Epstein observes that a categorical prohibition on eutha-
nasia/assisted suicide no longer makes sense when we are talking
about terminally ill persons.91 We may doubt the sincerity of a suicide
wish by a twenty-eight-year-old, physically healthy person, but we
have good reason to respect the choice of euthanasia or suicide by
someone with a metastatic cancer who is suffering great pain and in-
dignities and who has only a few weeks of life left. Accordingly, con-
cerns about the genuineness of consent do not apply to euthanasia/
assisted suicide in the context of terminal illness.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
On the constitutional issue, Epstein is correct. As he observes,
the law is indeterminate. Powerful arguments can be launched both
for and against a constitutional right to euthanasia or assisted sui-
cide.92 Indeed, if anything, Epstein underestimates the indeterminacy
of constitutional principles. He assumes that, if one accepts tradition
as the basis for locating constitutional rights, then one must reject a
constitutional right to euthanasia or assisted suicide.93 Yet, the argu-
ment from tradition depends on whether one defines the right at stake
as a right to euthanasia or assisted suicide without governmental inter-
ference, or a right to obtain relief from intolerable suffering without
governmental interference. If we frame the issue as involving a right
to obtain relief from intolerable suffering, then we can locate a right
to euthanasia or assisted suicide within that tradition.94
Given the indeterminacy of the issue, and especially the uncer-
tainty about which risks are greater-the risk of too many deaths from
allowing euthanasia or assisted suicide, or the risk of too much suffer-
ing from denying euthanasia or assisted suicide-Epstein would defer
to the judgment of legislatures.95
This is a reasonable position. It is true that proponents of a right
to assisted suicide or euthanasia reject the argument that risks of
abuse are sufficient to maintain the prohibitions on those practices.
Still, these proponents might be concerned enough by the risks that
dent that the pain is real, and therefore that the desire for death is legitimate, than when the
patient claims psychological pain from psychological illness.
91. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 304-05.
92. See id. at 329-43.
93. See id. at 329.
94. This argument was made in the brief of the United States in Glucksberg. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 passim (1997) (No. 96-110), reprinted at Center for Bioethics at the University of Penn-
sylvania, Physician Assisted Suicide Amicus Briefs (visited July 6, 1998) <http://
www.med.upenn.edu/-bioethic/PAS/43a.htm/> (on file with the University of Illinois Law
Review).
95. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 329-31.
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they would rather have the practices allowed at first on a limited basis
to ensure that their suppositions are correct. Moving state-by-state
rather than all at once, as this country did for fourteen years with the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment,96 makes sense on matters of
life and death.
A. The Existence of a Right to Euthanasia
Still, it is not possible to maintain an argument against a constitu-
tional right to euthanasia. That battle has already been lost. Once the
Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,9 7 it effectively recognized a constitutional right to euthanasia.
A right to refuse life-sustaining treatment necessarily implies a right
to euthanasia because patients are entitled both to receive medica-
tions that will relieve their suffering without killing them and to refuse
any life-sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion. With some terminally ill patients, these two entitlements to-
gether become a right to euthanasia.9"
This implication of Cruzan was made clear by the debate that
surrounded the Court's physician-assisted suicide cases. During the
debate, proponents of a constitutional right to assisted suicide argued
for its recognition on the ground that it is not always possible to re-
lieve the suffering of terminally ill patients.99 In some cases, it was
argued, assisted suicide is a necessary means for the relief of suffering.
In response to that argument, Justice Breyer in his Glucksberg concur-
rence observed that, for terminally ill patients who are suffering intol-
erably, physicians can sedate the patient so that the patient is no
longer able to sense the suffering. 1°° Indeed, if necessary, physicians
can sedate the patient into a coma.10' Once a terminally ill patient is
about to be sedated into a coma (i.e., "terminal sedation"), the patient
is likely to see no point in receiving food and water 10 2 and therefore
will ask that food and water be withheld or withdrawn.10 3 It is the
96. The New Jersey Supreme Court first recognized such a right in 1976 in In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), and the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right in 1990 in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
97. 497 U.S. 261.
98. My argument here draws on David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Physician-
Assisted Suicide: Rejecting Assisted Suicide but Embracing Euthanasia, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1236, 1238 (1997), and David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting
Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasia, HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q., Summer 1997, at 947.
99. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 2311.
101. See id. at 2311-12.
102. In some cases involving terminal sedation, the patient will already be unable to eat.
103. While in practice, terminal sedation seems to be limited to terminally ill patients, there
is no reason in principle why it must be so limited. For discussions of terminal sedation, see
Nathan I. Cherny & Russell K. Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of Refractory Symptoms:
Guidelines for Evaluation and Treatment, 10(2) J. PALLIATIVE CARE 31 (1994); William R.
Greene & William H. Davis, Titrated Intravenous Barbiturates in the Control of Symptoms in
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combination of a physician-induced coma and the withholding or
withdrawal of food and water that constitutes euthanasia. The physi-
cian is intentionally engaging in action that will inevitably result in the
patient's death.10 4
One might try to recharacterize sedation plus the withholding of
food and water as a form of treatment withdrawal rather than as a
form of euthanasia. However, that approach will not work. As dis-
cussed earlier, treatment withdrawals are justified on the ground that
the patient dies from the natural progression of the underlying disease
rather than from the physician's active intervention. 10 5 Nancy Cruzan
died when her feeding tube was withdrawn because her automobile
accident left her in a persistent vegetative state that in turn deprived
her of the ability to eat food and drink water.10 6 Kenneth Bergstedt
died when his ventilator was withdrawn because his swimming injury
left him quadriplegic and unable to breathe on his own.10 7 In contrast,
when a terminally sedated patient dies for lack of a feeding tube, it is
the physician-induced coma rather than the patient's underlying dis-
ease that makes the patient unable to eat or drink.
One might also try to distinguish terminal sedation from euthana-
sia by citing the principle of double effect. Under that principle, phy-
sicians may take steps that might hasten a patient's death as long as
the steps are a reasonable effort to treat the patient's suffering, and
the patient's death is not intended. 0 8 For example, it is permissible to
give analgesics or sedatives to alleviate a patient's pain even if the
drugs might sufficiently diminish the patient's respiratory drive such
that the patient is no longer able to breathe. However, the principle
of double effect justifies only the sedation part of terminal sedation.
Patients with Terminal Cancer, 84 S. MED. J. 332 (1991); Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Op-
tions of Last Resort: A Comparison of Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Seda-
tion, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 278 JAMA 2099, 2100 (1997);
Timothy E. Quill & Robert V. Brody, "You Promised Me I Wouldn't Die Like This!": A Bad
Death as a Medical Emergency, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1250 (1995); Subha Ramani &
Anand B. Karnad, Long- Term Subcutaneous Infusion of Midazolam for Refractory Delirium in
Terminal Breast Cancer, 89 S. MED. J. 1101 (1996).
104. It is true that the withholding of food and water is an "omission" and therefore a differ-
ent kind of action than an injection of a drug, and it is also true that the law often distinguishes
"acts" from "omissions." Nevertheless, as Justice Antonin Scalia has observed, the line between
appropriate and inappropriate patient deaths is not defined simply by the distinction between
action and inaction. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that if "one may not kill oneself by walking into the sea," then
one may also not "sit on the beach until submerged by the incoming tide").
Moreover, ethicists have long argued that withholding life-sustaining treatment is worse
than treatment withdrawal because treatment withdrawal at least comes after a trial of the ther-
apy, while withholding denies the chance for an unexpected recovery.
105. See supra text accompanying note 15.
106. Cf In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (N.J. 1985) ("[Rlejecting ... artificial means of
feeding would not constitute attempted suicide, as . . . death would result, if at all, from [the]
underlying medical condition, which included [an] inability to swallow.").
107. See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
108. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
206-11 (4th ed. 1994).
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We cannot justify the withdrawal of food and water part of terminal
sedation, for that step does nothing to relieve the patient's suffering; it
serves only to bring on the patient's death. If it is argued that with-
drawal of food and water is a permissible act, then we are back to the
previous response that it is permissible only because the patient's in-
ability to eat or drink results from an underlying disease.
A third potential basis for distinguishing terminal sedation from
euthanasia-the physician's intent-also fails. Although I have ar-
gued that considerations of intent do not help us distinguish among
treatment withdrawal, assisted suicide, and euthanasia, 1°9 arguments
about intent are still unhelpful even if we really could distinguish
treatment withdrawal from euthanasia in terms of the physician's in-
tent. For just as euthanasia is problematic because the patient's suf-
fering is relieved only by ending the patient's life, sedation plus the
withholding of food and water is problematic because the patient will,
with certainty, die. The withholding of food and water will inevitably
cause the patient's death, because no one can survive very long with-
out sustenance. Thus, unlike other cases of treatment withdrawal,
there is no possibility that the physician will have misjudged the pa-
tient's dependence on the treatment. 110 Moreover, the sedation will
preclude the possibility of patient survival from a mistaken prognosis.
Even if there is an improvement in the patient's underlying condition,
the sedation will prevent the patient from starting to eat or drink. 11
In short, if the physician's intent is the key, terminal sedation is still
more like euthanasia than it is like the withdrawal of treatment.
Finally, it might be asserted that, with terminal sedation, the pa-
tient's death really is the result of the underlying disease rather than
the physician's action. According to this argument, it is the patient's
illness that creates the need for the sedation. The underlying disease
is responsible for the patient's suffering and for the patient's request
for palliative care. But this logic would also justify euthanasia (and
assisted suicide). With euthanasia or assisted suicide, it is the patient's
underlying disease that causes the patient to ask for a life-ending drug.
It is not only the case that the right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment leads to a right to euthanasia, it is also the case that we would
not want to allow a right to refuse treatment without a right to eutha-
nasia in the form of terminal sedation. With a strict ban-on euthana-
sia, patients who are suffering so greatly that they need sedation into a
coma would have to waive their right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment once they had accepted heavy sedation. These patients would
109. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
110. When a ventilator is withdrawn, it is possible that the patient will be able to breathe
without assistance.
111. This fact distinguishes the terminally sedated patient from other patients, like Nancy
Cruzan, whose feeding tubes are withheld. In theory, it was possible for Ms. Cruzan to recover
her ability to eat and drink after her feeding tube was removed.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
have to choose between obtaining relief from suffering and retaining
their right to refuse treatment. Such a Hobson's choice would be pro-
foundly unfair to dying patients.
B. Assisted Suicide as a Preferred Right
Given the existence of a right to euthanasia through terminal se-
dation, a right to assisted suicide looks very different. Although we
should be concerned about the increased risks to patients if assisted
suicide is legalized in a world without assisted suicide or euthanasia,
assisted suicide is more likely to reduce the risks to patients in a world
with euthanasia because euthanasia is more subject to abuse than as-
sisted suicide.
Like other forms of euthanasia, terminal sedation not only raises
all of the risks of assisted suicide-any patient who could die by as-
sisted suicide could also die by terminal sedation 112-it raises an addi-
tional important risk. Assisted suicide has a built-in safeguard to
protect the incompetent patient. Because the patient committing sui-
cide must fill a prescription and ingest the death-causing drug, it is
difficult or impossible to coerce most mentally incompetent persons to
choose suicide.113 However, any incompetent person can be sedated
and have food and water withdrawn.
Assisted suicide and other forms of euthanasia (e.g., lethal injec-
tions) also provide greater benefit to patients than terminal sedation.
Dying patients often want to end their lives because of the indignities
of a prolonged death and the distorted memories that they will leave
behind. Assisted suicide and lethal injections allow patients to end
the dying process very quickly rather than waiting for dehydration or
starvation to end their lives.
Accordingly, although the Supreme Court had no choice but to
permit euthanasia in the form of terminal sedation, it did have a
choice whether to permit the potentially safer and more beneficial
practice of assisted suicide. Its decision not to do so is a potentially
serious flaw in the Court's reasoning.
V. CONCLUSION
As the debate over legalizing assisted suicide moves to the states,
Richard Epstein's insights will provide an important resource for
scholars, legislators, judges, and the public. Although many of his ar-
112. In other words, if assisted suicide and euthanasia are problematic because they kill the
healthy as well as the sick, then terminal sedation is similarly problematic because it can kill the
healthy as well as the sick. Similarly, if assisted suicide is problematic because we cannot trust
physicians to limit it to patients who are truly dying and suffering intolerably, then we cannot
trust physicians to limit terminal sedation to such patients. Whatever guidelines physicians ob-
serve in concluding that a patient is a candidate for terminal sedation, they can also observe in
concluding that a patient is a candidate for euthanasia or assisted suicide.
113. See Angell, supra note 21, at 51.
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guments will not persuade policy makers (e.g., the view that the terms
of the patient-physician relationship are entirely a matter to be de-
cided by patients and their physicians)," 4 he offers alternative argu-
ments that do not rely so heavily on his own world view (e.g., the
physician's professional role as healer cannot refute a right to assisted
suicide because physicians cause patients' deaths when they withdraw
life-sustaining treatment). 115
Of particular value is Epstein's response to the important concern
that society has no principled basis for granting terminally ill patients
a right to assisted suicide or euthanasia without granting other persons
such a right. If terminally ill patients can choose suicide because they
are irreversibly ill and suffering greatly, why cannot other patients so
choose if they are irreversibly ill and suffering greatly? Indeed, it is
observed, the patient who is not terminally ill has more time in which
to suffer and therefore arguably has a stronger basis for choosing sui-
cide. This concern has been raised by the Supreme Court in the physi-
cian-assisted suicide cases and by many scholars. 116 Epstein responds
to this concern with his important point about judging whether an au-
tonomous decision has been made by "observation in the individual
case" or "inference from background knowledge about general pat-
terns and motivations of human behavior.""' 7 As Epstein suggests, it
is possible to permit a limited right to assisted suicide without auto-
matically becoming committed to an expansive right to assisted sui-
cide." 8 Accordingly, it is reasonable for states to recognize a right to
assisted suicide without having to fear an inevitable slide down the
slippery slope to a world with unconstrained physician-assisted suicide
or euthanasia.
114. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 307.
115. See id. at 290-92.
116. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2274 (1997) (recognizing that "the
State may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and per-
haps even involuntary euthanasia"); Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Lim-
ited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 744-54 (1995) (discussing why it is likely that a right
to assisted suicide would be extended to include patients who are not terminally ill).
117. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 300-01; see supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
118. See also Orentlicher, Modest Revolution, supra note 5, at 471-75 (making the same
point from a different perspective).
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